Did the "Surge" make things better or worse?

Did the "Surge" make things better or worse?
Culpeper Star Exponent
Oct. 9, 2008
Robert Legge

The level of violence in Iraq has decreased markedly since President Bush initiated the "surge" in 2007. Yet despite this universally acclaimed success Bush remains unpopular and John McCain, an early supporter of the "surge", has seen little benefit from the success, as reflected in the polls. That can probably be attributed to the doubts still prevalent about going to war in Iraq in the first place.

Even early "surge" doubter Barack Obama has belatedly admitted that the "surge" has worked "beyond our wildest dreams".

And while the "surge" was more than simply sending 25,000 more US troops mostly to Baghdad, that's what gets most of the attention and credit for quelling the violence.

But is it plausible that 25,000 more troops would turn a nation of 27 million careening toward civil war into relative peace? That an infusion of new troops could scare away all the suicide bombers who are virtually impossible to stop? Tough case to make.

The reduction of violence was caused by multiple factors, some were part of US policy, some of Iraqi origin. Yes, the increase in troops had a stabilizing effect on the most volatile part of Iraq- Baghdad. Perhaps it changed the dynamics of the situation as it showed the US resolve to stay engaged in the conflict even when things got difficult.

But the "surge" was not just about more troops. It included the policy of assassinating high level al Qaeda in Iraq leaders, tighter border security and a willingness to patrol the streets among the population making them feel more protected.

But the "surge" would never have been successful without Iraqi involvement. The Iraqi army grew by 100,000 during this period.

We also started paying Sunni militia members (many former insurgents) $360/month. The warlords who direct them usually get 20% of their salary. Many of them have gotten accustomed to the large and steady income.

Al Qaeda in Iraq made a grave tactical error in murdering many top Sunni leaders. This miscalculation eventually turned the majority Sunnis against their former allies and toward the Americans. Some top Shia leaders have convinced their militias to lay down their arms so they could participate in government power-sharing that was unavailable to them under Saddam.

There is some evidence that Iran has stopped exporting bomb-making supplies. It is also not hard to imagine that many people just grew tired of the violence and chaos.

Random deaths were also reduced because most of the formerly diverse neighborhoods are now ethnically cleansed. Five million Iraqis (20%) are now either internally displaced or have left for another county. In many neighborhoods there is simply no one left to kill.

Unfortunately some of the very things that have contributed to the lessening of violence have also made a long term solution more difficult. Baghdad is now controlled mostly by Shias. Sunnis trying to get their houses back risk death. The payments to thousands of Sunni tribesmen keeps them passive, but when they realize that they will never again dominate the government as they did under Saddam they may no longer see Americans as their friends.

Such payments have only contributed to the retribalization of Iraq. These increasingly powerful Sunni tribes contest Shia-dominated state authority, further decreasing the chances of real reconciliation. Failure to absorb the Sunnis into the military and economic life of Iraq will only decrease state authority, especially outside Baghdad, increase competition between the militias and destabilize the entire country. Criminal gangs of Kurds and Shias have also learned to exploit the lack of federal control.

There is little likelihood of any long term political settlement as long as we continue policies that work to splinter the country along religious lines. The perhaps unintended but all too evident consequences of increased warlordism have been a direct result of the widely lauded "surge". When we finally leave Iraq we will have left a far more divided country than the one we entered. The long term outlook is not nearly as promising as "surge" supporters would have us think.